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Germany's Statutory Works Councils and
Employee Codetermination: A Model
for the United States?
CAROL

I.

D.

RASNIC*

INTRODUCTION

Since 1957, business management in the Federal Republic of
Germany ("FRG")' has had a duty under the Labor-Management
Relations Act 2 to consult with employee works councils before implementing significant management decisions. The parliament of the
FRG 3 expanded employee rights in 1976, by passing the
Codetermination Act.4 This Act requires the number of employee
representatives on the supervisory boards 5 of German companies to
equal the number of board members representing shareholder
interests.
In the United States, labor and management factions have long
debated the advisability of effecting such a system. However, before
analyzing the pragmatics of implementing employee works councils in
*
Associate Professor of Labor Law, Virginia Commonwealth University. B.A., University of Kentucky, 1962; J.D., Vanderbilt University, 1965. Research for this Article was
funded in part by the Virginia Commonwealth University Grants-in-Aid for Faculty Program.
1. In 1948, after World War II, the British, French, and United States zones of occupation joined to create the FRG. Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic
of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 4117, T.I.A.S. No. 3425; see also Bruno Simma, Legal
Aspects of East-West German Relations, 9 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 97, 99 (1985). Before
reunification on October 3, 1990, the FRG consisted of the 11 West German states: BadenWirttemberg, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Lower Saxony, North Rhine/Westphalia,
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein, and West Berlin. Since reunification,
Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thiringen, the five
states of the former German Democratic Republic, as well as East Berlin, are also included in
the FRG. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der deutschen demokratischen Republik iber die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands-Einisgungsvertrag-(Zweiter
Staatsvertrag) [Treaty on the Creation of German Unity], Sept. 6, 1990, F.R.G.-G.D.R., 104
PRESSE-UND INFORMATIONSAMT DER BUNDESREGIERRUNG

BULLETIN

877 (F.R.G.).

2. Betriebsverfassungsgestz [BetrVG], 1988 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl.] I 2261.
3. The FRG's parliament is known as the Bundestag.
4. Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MitbG], 1976 BGB1. 1 1153.
5. German corporation law provides for a supervisory board, which supervises and
elects the board of management. Aktiengesetz [AktG] §§ 76(3), 84, 1965 BGBI. 1 1089.
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the United States, the constitutionality of such a system must be
addressed.
This Article first describes the mechanisms of German works
councils and codetermination. Next, it compares the laws that are
applicable to collective bargaining in the FRG and in the United
States. This Article then considers the constitutional obstacles to instituting works councils and codetermination in the United States.
Finally, this Article synthesizes German and United States law in an
effort to determine the feasibility of incorporating either works councils or codetermination, or both, into United States law.

II.

WORKS COUNCILS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Many Western European legislatures have established
mandatory bodies comprised in part of employees, which serve as
consultants and advisors to management. Such statutes have been enacted not only in the FRG, 6 but also in Austria, France, Luxembourg,
7
the Netherlands, and Spain.
The German Labor-Management Relations Act, 8 which was enacted by the Parliament in 1952 and amended in 1972, applies to any
business with five or more employees. 9 However, it appears that only
very large firms comply with this legislative mandate. "0 Many smaller
companies of fifty or fewer employees do not establish the statutorily
required works councils." 1
The Labor-Management Relations Act requires businesses to establish a "works council" composed of representatives of employees
and management. 12 The employee representatives are elected by employees who are eighteen years of age or older and who have been
6.

BetrVG.

7.

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, WORKERS PARTICIPA-

(1981) [hereinafter ILO].
8. BetrVG.
9. Id.§l.
10. See 3 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA § 1.5(A)-(D)(1) (Kenneth Robert
Redden ed., perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990) [hereinafter MLSC]. Section 1.5(D)(1) states: "As a rule
it will be difficult to find a German enterprise employing more than 50 people which has not
established a works council." Id.
11. Manfred Weiss, Federal Republic of Germany, 9 COMP. LAB. L.J. 82, 83 (1987).
12. The number of employees on the works council increases as the number of people
employed increases. A business with 1000 employees must have 11 employees on its works
council. A business with 9000 employees must have 31 employees on its works council. A
business with more than 9000 workers must add an additional two employee members for each
additional 3000 employees. BetrVG § 9.
TION IN DECISIONS WITHIN UNDERTAKINGS 85
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employed at the company for at least six months.' 3 Works council
members, who serve a term of four years, 14 are not paid for their service on the council. 1 5 The Act provides for blue-collar and whitecollar workers to be elected to the works council proportionately. 16
Those who are elected enjoy special protection against discharge and
suffer no job disadvantages because of their membership on the council.17 Further, there is no conflict between works council membership
and membership in a union."' In fact, many union members also
serve on German works councils. 19

Under the Labor-Management Relations Act, an employer must
advise its works council before implementing a management decision
in the following areas: (1) rules governing employee conduct and
plant operation; 20 (2) transfer or termination of an employee; 21 and
(3) extraordinary discharge of an employee. 22 Further, the Act lists
twelve areas in which the works council must be consulted and approve a workplace rule before it becomes effective. 23 Since the Act
13.

Id. §§ 7, 8.

14. Id. § 21.
15. Id. § 37.
Id. §§ 5-10.
Id. § 37; KONDIGUNGSCHUTZGESETZ [KSchG] § 15(1).
ILO, supra note 7, at 141.
Id. at 137-38.
BetrVG § 90.
Id. § 99. This section applies only to firms that regularly employ more than twenty
employees who are entitled to vote. Id.
22. Id. § 102.
23. BetrVG section 87 lists those areas where works councils must be consulted and must
approve workplace rules before they become binding. They are:
1. Questions of order in the workplace and the behavior of employees in the
workplace;
2. The beginning and ending of daily working hours, including breaks, as well
as the number of hours to be worked on each day of the week;
3. Temporary shortening or lengthening of the normal working hours;
4. Time, place, and manner of payment of wages;
5. The establishment of general regulations regarding vacations and the vacation schedule, as well as the scheduling of the vacations of individual employees
when the employer and the employee involved cannot reach an agreement;
6. The introduction and application of technical devices designed to monitor
the behavior or performance of employees;
7. Rules relating to the prevention of work-related accidents and occupational
illnesses, as well as those relating to the protection of employee health in the framework of statutory requirements or regulations for the prevention of accidents;
8. The form, extent, and administration of social measures whose effect is limited to the particular workplace, business sector or company;
9. The granting and denial of living quarters which are rented to the employee
in consideration of the employment relationship, as well as the basic rules for the use
of such living quarters;
10. Questions regarding the determination of wages, in particular the estab16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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prohibits strikes over workplace rules, conflicts are resolved through a
statutory arbitration process. 24 The Act provides for the establishment of either a permanent arbitration committee or an ad hoc committee. 25 As a practical matter, a permanent committee is rarely
named, due to the predictability that results when the same group
26
decides each dispute.
As the Labor-Management Relations Act does not set forth the
required number for membership on these arbitration committees,
their size is determined by the works council and the employer. 2 7 Labor and management must be equally represented, 28 with a neutral
chairperson chosen by the entire body. 29 When the panel is unable to
agree on a chairperson, the local labor court 30 appoints one. 31 Due to
the court's power to appoint, the chairperson is often a judge from
32
one of the labor courts.
The Act does not establish committee procedures, but because
the chairperson frequently is a labor law judge, the procedures are
generally similar to those of a labor court.3 3 The chairperson is usually well-paid by the employer. 34 If external members are appointed
lishment of general rules regarding wages, as well as the introduction and application
of new methods of payment, or a change in these methods;
11. The establishment of profit-sharing or bonus plans and comparable performance-related compensation; and
12. Basic rules governing the company's suggestion system.
Id.
24. Id. § 76. Although the works council as an entity cannot strike to force an agreement
on a workplace rule, the individual council members who are union members may participate
in a union-authorized strike.
25. Id.
26. Weiss, supra note 11, at 84.
27. BetrVG § 76(1).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. In Germany, courts are classified according to subject matter (i.e., civil, criminal,
administrative, social, tax, and labor). Although there are state (Ldnder) courts, state and
federal courts apply the same federal law. Federal courts are the highest in the jurisdictional
hierarchy. For labor matters, the lowest court is the Arbeitsgericht, or labor court. Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz [ArbGG] §§ 14-31, 1990 BGBI II 889. The lowest level appellate court is the
Ldndesarbeitsgericht, or state labor court. Id. §§ 33-39. The highest appellate court is the
Bundesarbeitsgericht,or federal labor court. Id. §§ 40-45. There are no juries in Germany,
and lay persons typically serve as associate judges, with a professional judge as the chief judge.
31. BetrVG § 17(3).
32. Manfred Weiss, The Role of Neutrals in the Resolution of Interest Disputes in the
Federal Republic of Germany, 10 CoMp. LAB. L.J. 339, 350 (1988).
33. Weiss, supra note II, at 87.
34. Id. at 85; see also BetrVG § 76a(3) (requiring that the employer compensate the
chairperson).
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to provide expertise, the employer must compensate them as well. 35
The chairperson votes only in the case of a tie, and the local labor
court hears the appeals. 3 6 The arbitration process begins upon the
application of either party; 37 however, because arbitration poses a
greater threat to the employer than to the works council, it has
38
proven to be a strong weapon for the works council.

In addition to consulting the works council about workplace
rules, an employer with twenty or more workers must inform the
works council before the employer transfers or terminates an employee. 39 The works council must respond within one week after notification of a planned employee transfer. 4° The employer may proceed
with the transfer if the council consents to the transfer or fails to respond within the statutory time period. 4 1 If the works council objects,
however, the employer may effect the transfer only by first appealing
to the labor court.42 This court
will grant the appeal only if the coun43
cil's refusal was unjustified.

Under German law, an employer may discharge an employee
who has worked continuously for at least six months for one of the
following three reasons: (1) economic concerns unrelated to the employee; 44 (2) the employee's personal condition; 45 or (3) the em-

ployee's

work-related

misconduct

or

unacceptable

work

35. According to the federal labor court, this pay must be at least 70% of the chairperson's pay. Judgment of May 11, 1976, 28 Entscheidungen des Bundesarbeitsgerichts [BAGEl
103. In practice, the internal and external members appointed by the employer generally are
not paid. See BetrVG § 76a(2); Weiss, supra note 11, at 85-86.
36. BetrVG § 78(4).
37. Id. § 76(5).
38. Weiss, supra note 32, at 352.
39. BetrVG § 99(1).
40. Id. § 99(3).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 99(4).
43. Examples of statutory justifications include the willful violation of an approved company rule, and unjust disadvantage to either the employee transferee or other employees resulting from the transfer. Weiss, supra note 32, at 352. The labor court limits its jurisdiction to
the issue of whether or not the works council exceeded its discretionary powers. Thus, only if
the council's refusal to approve a transfer was unjustified will the court permit the employer to
proceed with the transfer. Id.
44. "Betriebsbedingtkiindigung," or "discharge because of conditions." KSchG § 1(3).
If the employer plans to terminate employees because of business difficulties, the law requires
that the employer do so according to their seniority, age, and number of dependents. Id.
45. "Personenbedingtkiindigung," or "discharge because of personal conditions." Id.
§ 1(2). For example, the employer may legitimately discharge an employee who falls ill and is
unable to work.
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performance. 46 Discharge without prior notice to the works council is
illegal, and the employer cannot later correct a failure to notify the
works council of a planned termination. 47 Once notified by the employer, the works council has one week to respond to the proposed
termination. 48 If the employer proceeds with the termination, the employee's recourse is to sue the employer in a local labor court, regardless of the council's earlier decision.
The powers of a German works council are generally classified as
the powers of information, consultation, codetermination, 49 and direct
autonomous management of some business actions. 50 The council is
competent to review economic questions, 51 staff problems, 52 and wel53
fare activities.
The German works council concept is not new. As early as
1848, the assembly in Frankfurt am Main considered a bill providing
for the establishment of factory councils. 54 Although the bill was ultimately rejected, many German enterprises later established employee
46. "Verhaltungsbedingtkuindigung," or "discharge because of behavior." Id. The federal labor court has held that the employer must first warn an employee who is being considered for discharge due to the employee's work-related misconduct or unacceptable work
performance.
47. BetrVG § 102(1).
48. The Act specifies reasons for which the works council might refuse to approve a
termination. Id. § 102(3). BetrVG section 102(3) provides:
The Works Council can, within the period provided for by section 2(1), oppose the
termination when:
1. The employer, in selecting the employee to be terminated, has not considered, or
has insufficiently considered, social aspects;
2. The termination violates one of the guidelines established by the Works Council
for the selection of those to be hired, transferred or terminated;
3. The employee to be terminated can be further employed in another job at the
same workplace, or in another workplace of the same company;
4. It is possible, following a reasonable amount of retraining or further education,
to further employ the employee;
5. It is possible to further employ the employee under a different contractual basis,
and the employee has consented to such an arrangement.
Id.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 70-115, which discusses the Codetermination Act.
50. ILO, supra note 7, at 138.
51. Id. at 139. The works council's economic rights are, for the most part, merely informative. In businesses with 100 or more employees, an economic committee of three to
seven employees meets monthly with management, and acts as a liaison between management
and the works council on all economic issues. BetrVG § 106.
52. ILO, supra note 7, at 139.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 138 (referring to G. ERDMANN, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER DEUTSCHE
SOZIALGESETZGEBUNG (1957) and H.J. TEUTEBERG, GESCHICHTE DER INDUSTRIELLEN
MITBESTIMMUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND

(1961)).
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councils voluntarily."5 Later, the 1891 Labor Protection Act56 established workers' committees, although the use of such committees was
left to the discretion of employers.57 During World War I, the Auxiliary Service Act 58 required the use of workers' committees. 59 The
First Works Council Act of 192060 required works councils to actually participate in management decisions concerning social, personnel,
and economic matters. 6' It did not, however, empower works councils to veto management decisions. The 1933 Order of National Labor Act 62 abolished the First Works Council Act of 1920, as well as
the Supervisory Board Act of 1922,63 which provided for the election
of employees to supervisory boards. 64 World War II taught the German labor force that unity was imperative,65 and labor cooperated to
influence new post-war legislation.
After the end of World War II, the occupying powers put these
laws back into effect through the Allied Control Council Act No. 22
("Works Council Act"). 66 Individual states 67 initially implemented
the Works Council Act. The federal government, however, superseded the Works Council Act with the 1952 Labor-Management Relations Act, subsequently amended in 1972.68 Germany has since
firmly established worker participation at the plant level.
Employers felt a direct and substantial financial burden as a result of the implementation of works councils, since compliance with
the Act raised labor costs considerably. Additionally, an indirect cost
arose from the education of works council members in management
strategy. Nonetheless, the broadened powers of works councils have
not caused Germany any significant problems in recent years. This
55. Id.
56. Arbeitsschutzgesetz.
57. MLSC, supra note 10, § 1.5(B).
58. Hilfsdienstgesetz.
59. MLSC, supra note 10, § 1.5(B).
60. I. Betriebsratsgesetz.
61. MLSC, supra note 10, § 1.5(B).
62. Gesetz zur Ordnung der nationalenArbeit.
63. Aufsichtsratsgesetz.
64. MLSC, supra note 10, § 1.5(B).
65. See Manfred Weiss, FederalRepublic of Germany, in 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 29 (Roger Blanpain ed., 1986).

66. See MLSC, supra note 10, § 1.5(B).
67. Ldnder.
68. The 1972 amendments broadened the scope of works council power. It is worth noting that German labor unions objected to the 1952 Act because of a general feeling among
members that the works council's power was too restricted. Weiss, supra note 65, at 149.
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can be attributed to the long-standing tradition of employee participation, employers' overall acceptance of the principle, and labor's con69
siderable support of management.
A.

Codetermination in Germany

Just as the works council statute dictated plant-level worker participation, the Codetermination Act of 197670 introduced the concept
of mandatory equal voice for workers at the supervisory board 7' level.
The German corporate model can be contrasted with the United
States corporate model as follows:
69.
70.
71.

ILO, supra note 7, at 141.
MitbG.
Aufsichtsrat.
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FIGURE A
(1) The German Corporation
SUPERVISORY BOARD
(A ufsichtsrat)
Consists of shareholders
and employee representatives
appoints and
supervises
I
BOARD OF MANAGEMENT
(Vorstand)
Sets company policy

(2)

The United States Corporation
SHAREHOLDERS
Owners of corporation
I
elect
I
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Sets company policy
I
appoints
I
OFFICERS
Operate business
on day-to-day basis

A German board of management is equivalent to a United States
corporation's board of directors. However, there is no United States
counterpart to a German supervisory board. By statute, the supervisory board has no management functions. 72 Additionally, an individ72.

AktG § 111,

4.
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ual cannot simultaneously serve on both boards. 73 Although the
board of management directs and operates the company, 74 "it must
report to the supervisory board regularly and upon request"7 5 regarding company affairs. 76 The supervisory board may also inspect the
company books and records at any time. 77
The 1976 Codetermination Act applies to all businesses that regularly employ more than 2000 workers. 78 The statute exempts mutual insurance companies, unincorporated businesses, and churches. 79
As of 1990, approximately 450 German businesses were subject to this
legislation,80 which mandates that labor representation on the supervisory board be at a level just below that of management. 81 The
Codetermination Act also requires that fifty percent of the supervisory board membership8 2 represent the employees. 83 As on the works
council, blue-collar and white-collar supervisory board members
share seats according to their proportion of the employer's labor
force.

84

Supervisory board members are directly elected by the employees
in firms with 8000 or fewer employees. In firms with more than 8000
employees, supervisory board members are elected by delegates. 8 5
Two or three of the elected employee representatives must be union
representatives, depending upon the size of the workforce. 86 Decisions may be rendered at supervisory board meetings if there is a quorum of at least fifty percent. A vote by a majority of the quorum is
73.
74.

Id. § 105.
Id. § 76.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. § 90, 3.
Id. § 90.
Id. § 111, 1 2.
MitbG § l(l)(2).
Id. § 1(4)(1).

80.

MLSC, supra note 10, § 1.5(E)(2).

81.

MitbG § 7(2).

82. Supervisory boards are comprised of 12 to 20 persons, depending upon the size of the
company. In companies with up to 10,000 employees, the Act requires six shareholder (Anteilseigner) representatives and six employee representatives. In companies with 10,001 to 20,000
employees, the Act requires eight of each type of representative. In companies with more than

20,000 employees, the Act requires 10 of each type of representative. Id. § 7(1). The employee
representatives must be at least 18 years old, and they must have been employed by the company for at least one year. Id. § 7(3).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 11(2).
85. Id. § 9(l)-(2).
86. Id. § 7(2).

Works Councils and Employee Codetermination

1992]

decisive.8 7 If after two such votes the supervisory board is stalemated,
the chairperson casts the determinative vote.8 8 A chairperson and
deputy chairperson are elected from among the members of the supervisory board by a two-thirds vote.8 9 If the board cannot reach a twothirds majority on the first ballot, those members representing shareholder interests elect the chairperson by majority vote. 90
The supervisory board's one-vote-per-member principle is comparable to the United States' principle of one-vote-per-share, which
applies to stock corporations. 91 The latter principle clearly allows a
majority shareholder to have the controlling voice in all shareholder
actions. 92 However, the power of German shareholders co-exists with
that of the supervisory board's employee representatives, such that
degree of ownership does not dictate the outcome. Thus, the German
configuration equates the single stockholder supervisory board member with his or her employee colleague.
Because these revolutionary requirements diluted management's
power, they met with expected opposition from German employers.
Unions also objected. In the unions' view, the voice of labor was dissipated by the shareholders' power to elect the chairperson when the
board deadlocks, and by the chairperson's power to cast the tie-breaking vote. 93 After July 1, 1976, the effective date of the statute, a management coalition petitioned the Federal Constitutional Court 94 to

declare the law unconstitutional on two grounds: (1) the Basic Law, 95
the constitution of the FRG, vested private citizens with the right to
87.
88.

AktG §§ 5, 11.1, 95.
MitbG § 27(1).

89.

Id.

90. Id. § 27(1)-(2).
91. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 189 (3d ed. 1983).
92. See 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations§ 762 (1985).
93. ILO, supra note 7, at 89-90; Franz-Juirgen Sicker, The German Model of
Codetermination:Perspectives, Confrontative Issues and ProspectiveDevelopments, in MANAGEMENT UNDER DIFFERING VALUE SYSTEMS 328 (Ginter Dugos et al. eds., 1981).
94. The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht)is Germany's highest
court. It is therefore equivalent to the United States Supreme Court, except that it deals exclusively with questions of constitutional law. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 93.
95. Germany's constitution is called the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The drafters termed it
the Basic Law rather than the Constitution (Verfassung) because, at the time of its drafting,
they anticipated writing a new constitution upon reunification. Simma, supra note 1, at 99 n.5.
However, when Germany reunified, East Germany acceded to the Basic Law, due to considerations of "speed and simplicity." See GG art. 23; DER SPIEGEL, Sept. 3, 1990, at 19.
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dispose of their property as they wished; 96 and (2) the Basic Law assured freedom of association and collective bargaining between equal
parties independent of each other.9 7 Some commentators deemed this
challenge to be an effort to clarify the statute's requirements for management concessions to union demands, rather than general hostility
to codetermination. 9 8 On March 1, 1979, the Federal Constitutional
Court ruled that the law was constitutional. 9 9 This ruling firmly embedded the law in German corporate management.
Other western European countries, however, take an alternate
view. England, France, and Italy consider Germany's codetermination statute a betrayal of the working class because it "de-radicalize[d]
the trade unions and integrate[d] them into the capitalist system." 1
Indeed, many free enterprise and liberal market economy advocates
perceive codetermination as the "first step toward communism," 10
'
although German labor unions and political parties regard the principle simply as a compromise between capitalism and communism. 102
A member of a board of management who knowingly makes untrue or misleading statements about the company's financial position
is subject to criminal penalties under German law. 10 3 In stark contrast, a supervisory board member who fails to act in a company's
best interest is unlikely to be held even civilly liable.' °4 One longserving supervisory board member mused that it is indeed "easier to
get a grip on a slippery eel" than to hold a supervisory board member
liable for damages. 105 Consequently, employees generally are not dissuaded from service for fear of liability.
The German parliament's decision to mandate employee representation at the supervisory board level, rather than at the board of
management level, was based on two underlying rationales. First, labor delegates generally lack sufficient expertise to participate in actual
management decisions. Second, there is a genuine need for board
96. GG art. 14. For a comparison of this provision in the Basic Law and the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, see infra text accompanying notes 171-77.
97. GG art. 9.
98. MLSC, supra note 10, § 1.5(E)(7).
99. Judgment of March 1, 1979, 26 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] 1.
100. See Saeker, supra note 93, at 312.

101. Id.
102. Id.
103.
104.
105.

AktG § 400.
See Sicker, supra note 93, at 327.
Id.
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managers to present themselves to third parties as a homogeneous
10 6
body, rather than as a heterogeneous mixture of "them and us."1
Objections to the codetermination principle remain, despite its
adoption by the German parliament. One objection is that board of
management members depend upon supervisory board labor representatives for their re-election. 0 7 Consequently, board of management members may feel obligated to favor labor, thereby weakening
the employer's collective bargaining position. Another objection is
that innovative investments will be more difficult to implement because labor typically emphasizes job retention as the company's main
objective.108 An additional objection is that the labor-management
collusion resulting from codetermination may lead employers to pressure employees involved in the codetermination process to circumvent
laws on competition. 10 9 Further, it is argued that supervisory board
representatives may act in accordance with what they feel is a suitable
return on equity, i.e., interest on money the company borrowed,
rather than in accordance with the actual risk involved. 110
Despite extensive mandatory employee participation in management decisions at the supervisory level, the basic capitalist structure
of the FRG is founded on the principle that the employer, not the
employee, is the true owner of production.11 1 The German position is
that the parliament, in enacting codetermination laws, has merely determined employees' rights that emanate from their ownership of the
means of production, rather than of the production process itself." 12
According to Professor Franz-Jirgen Sacker, codetermination
may indeed "reduce the dynamism of competitive market
processes."' 1 13 Professor Sacker concludes that most management
boards will be comprised not of "impatient, enterprising pioneer businessmen, but of patient, friendly administrators who are keen on compromise, avoid making decisions involving high risks and who are
trained in political bureaucratic day-to-day business."' 114 Regardless
of its effects on the marketplace, it is generally accepted that the
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 325.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 335-36.
Id.
Id.
HANAU ADOMEIT, 1 ARBEITSRECHT 17 (2d ed. 1988).
Id.
Sicker, supra note 93, at 336.
Id. at 337.
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FRG's codetermination process has extended employee participation
rights beyond those in any other Western country. 115
B.

Employees' Management Rights in the Mining, Iron,
and Steel Industries

In 1951, the parliament of the FRG enacted the Act on the Proportional Codetermination of Employees in Enterprises of the Mining, Iron, and Steel-Producing Industries." 16 This statute provides for
employee membership on the boards of management 17 of companies
that have 1000 or more employees. 1 18 Under the Codetermination
Act, this is the sole instance in which employee representation is assured directly at the management level.
III.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Collective bargaining in the FRG embraces two types of contracts: (1) contracts between employers and works councils regarding
shop rules; 19 and (2) union contracts with employers. In order to
distinguish between these two types of contracts, it is helpful to compare the contractual role of unions in the FRG with that of the
United States.
The FRG's 1949 Act on Collective Bargaining, which was
amended in 1969, governs union contracts. 120 Unlike the statutory
right to bargain collectively in the United States, 12 1 the right to associate in the FRG has a constitutionalbasis. 122 The significance of this
distinction is twofold. First, German law emphasizes the fundamental nature of the right to associate. 123 Second, altering a constitution
is a complex and difficult process, compared to the relative ease of
115. MLSC, supra note 10, § 1.5(A).
116. Gesetz iiber die paritiitische Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in Bergbauunternehmungen des Eisen und Stahlindustrie-Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz [MontanMitbG],
1951 BGBI. I 347.
117. MontanMitbG section 13 provides that the majority of the employee representatives
on the supervisory board shall name one director, or member of the board of management. See
id. § 13.
118. Id. § 1(2).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 6-69.
120. Tarifvertragsgesetz [TVG], 1969 BGB. 1 1323.
121. See Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C.).
122. GG art. 9(3). The Basic Law assures that the "right to form associations to safeguard
and improve working and economic conditions shall be granted to everyone and to all occupations." Id.
123. The Basic Law, which contains 141 articles, lists many rights that do not appear in
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amending a statute.1 24 The United States' Taft-Hartley Act 125 grants
the right not to associate with a union. 26 In Germany, the Federal
Constitutional Court has determined that the right not to associate is
implied by the express right to associate that is assured by article 9(3)
12 7
of the Basic Law.
In the United States, the Taft-Hartley Act provides that a union
is the exclusive bargaining representative of a bargaining unit in a
plant or business, with union representatives elected by a majority of
the workers in that unit. 128 Both the employer 29 and the union 3 0
must bargain in "good faith with respect to hours, wages, and terms
and conditions of employment"'' a when negotiating to produce a collective bargaining agreement. In Germany, the employer has no cor13 2
responding duty to bargain.
In the United States, employers may belong to multi-bargaining
groups.13 3 Such groups, however, do not compare to the much larger
groups to which the majority of German employers belong. German
companies generally belong to two associations of employers: a group
the United States Constitution. The United States Constitution contains just seven articles and
has had only 26 amendments in the more than 200 years since its ratification. See U.S. CONST.
124. Article 79 of the Basic Law states that amendments require two-thirds of the voting
members of the federal parliament (Bundestag) and two-thirds of the voting members of the
representatives from the various states (Bundesrat). See GG art. 79. Although not quite as
strict as the United States Constitution's three-fourths state legislature requirement for ratification of a proposed constitutional amendment, the Basic Law is indeed difficult to alter. See
U.S. CONST. art. V.
125. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
126. Id.§ 157. Section 158(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act specifies that union shop provisions (clauses providing that an employee must become a union member within a designated
time, not to be less than 30 days, after employment or the effective date of the clause) are
permitted, but section 164(b) allows the individual states to declare such provisions unenforceable. Id. §§ 158(a)(3), 164(b). The states that have done so generally are referred to as "rightto-work" states.
127. 50 BVerfGE 290, 367.
128. Taft-Hartley Act § 159.
129. Id. § 158(a)(5).
130. Id. § 158(b)(3).
131. Id. § 158(d).
132. Weiss, supra note 65, at 128.
133. See 48 AM. JUR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations § 669 (1985). For example, the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association, which consists of more than 100 member employers,
negotiates a single contract with the United Mine Workers' Association. Similarly, the Major
League Baseball Owners' Association, consisting of the 26 owners of the National and American League professional baseball clubs, has one contract with the Major League Players'
Association.
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of inter-industrial employers, and a regional group of employers in a
particular industry.
The German associations of inter-industrial employers are not
parties to any collective bargaining agreements, 34 but because a significant majority of German companies belong to such groups, 3 5 they
are nonetheless influential. The largest such association is the Federal
136
Society of German Employers' Associations.
Regional associations consist of employers in a particular industry. The German concept of "industry" is quite broad. For example,
the "metal industry" is an association of employers from the automobile, electric, shipbuilding, and machine-building industries, among
others. 37 Although the union and the employer negotiate the geographic boundaries of each region, 38 an industry's collective bargaining agreements vary little, if at all, among the regions. a9
Unions are also organized along industrial, rather than craft,
lines.m40 Typically, unions are quite large; the largest, IG Metall, has
approximately 2,681,000 members.' 4 ' Most unions belong to an even
larger association, the German Labor Union Federation, which in
42
1988 had over 7,000,000 members.
German labor law distinguishes between two types of workers:
blue-collar workers (Arbeitern) who are paid wages (Lohn), and
43
white-collar workers (Angestellten) who are paid salaries (Gehalt ).1
Membership in the German Labor Union Federation is approximately seventy-five percent blue-collar and twenty-five percent whitecollar.'" The members execute a single collective bargaining agree134. Dr. Reinhard Richardi, Kommentar zum btirgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einfuhrungsgestz und Nebengesetzen, in RECHT DER SCHULDVERHALTNISSE
611-15 (Julius von Staudinger ed., 12th ed. 1957).
135. Manfred Weiss et al., The Settlement of Labour Disputes in the FederalRepublic of
Germany, in INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN MARKET ECONOMIES 93 (Tadashi

Hanami
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

& Roger Blanpain eds., 1984).
Id.
Weiss, supra note 32, at 339.
Id. at 340. The metal industry, for example, has 16 regions.
Id.
Sicker, supra note 93, at 319.
Id. at 318.
Richardi, supra note 134,
239 (citing STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH

FOR DIE

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 598 (1988)).

143. Id. Generally, Arbeitern include those who perform manual labor, and Angestellten
include those whose work is mental or discretionary in nature. Id.
334.
144.

Id.

917.
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ment that covers both groups.

45

As the concept of Angestellten statu-

torily includes such occupations as ship captain, office administrator,
and plant foreman,' 1" it encompasses workers who would be classified
as "supervisors" under United States labor law. 14 7 In the United
States, "supervisors" are expressly excluded from the Taft-Hartley
definition of "employee,"' 148 and cannot be union members for purposes of collective bargaining. Thus, the collective bargaining concept
in the FRG encompasses more workers than its counterpart in the
United States.
In the FRG, the regional unit of an employer's industrial association and the union for that industry negotiate the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, the contract is identical for all workers in
that industry in the particular geographic region. 149 Single employers
may also contract with unions. 150 The governing statute prescribes
strict procedures for collective bargaining agreements with employer
associations, l5
but these procedures are inapplicable to contracts be-

tween a union and a single employer. 152 Although there is no mandated form,15 3 the statute requires all collective bargaining agreements
54

to be in writing. 1
Perhaps the most critical distinction between union-employer
contracts in the United States and Germany is the duty of United
States employers to extend contract rights to all employees, regardless
of whether they are union members. 5 5 The United States employer
145. Id. T 349.
146. Werkmeistern.
147. Section 152(11) of the Taft-Hartley Act defines "supervisor" as
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
Taft-Hartley Act § 152(11).
148. Id. § 152(3).
149. Richardi, supra note 134, 1 938.
150. Id. A contract to which a regional employer group is a party is called a Verbandstarifvertrag(association collective bargaining agreement), while a contract between a single
employer and a union is called a Firmentarifvertrag (company collective bargaining
agreement).
151. TVG § 2(3).
152. Richardi, supra note 134, 926.
153. Id.
925.
154. TVG § 125(2).
155. Section 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides that an employer may not discriminate against an employee if the employer has reason to believe that the employee was denied
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who differentiates between union and non-union employees commits
an unfair labor practice,1 56 since the union, once certified, is the official representative of all employees within the bargaining unit. Conversely, a German employer may refuse to apply the provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement, such as those concerning wages and
retirement benefits, to non-union employees.15" The underlying rationale is analogous to the consideration element in contract law. By
paying dues, union members are entitled to collective bargaining
agreement benefits as parties to the contract. Non-union employees,
however, do not pay dues and therefore fail to furnish consideration
for the resulting benefits. Thus, only union members may be parties
158
to the collective bargaining agreement.
The union, however, cannot be a party to an agreement to exclude non-members from contractual benefits. 5 9 Such exclusion is
legal only if it is the employer's unilateral decision.' ° Although employers may choose to extend contractual benefits under collective
bargaining agreements only to union members, in practice, most employers grant the same contractual rights to non-union employees as a
means of keeping union membership to a minimum. 61 Those who
adhere to the consideration principle view this action as inequitable,
and one commentator has criticized it as a "remarkable consequence
•.. [since] although the exercise of the positive freedom of association
must be bought with an economic sacrifice, approximately one percent of a worker's monthly income [i.e., union dues], the exercise of
the negative freedom of association may not be burdened with the loss
62
of a vacation bonus."'
The differences between a union contract and a works council
agreement are illustrated by the following: (1) the ability of the German employer to provide union members with favorable treatment
union membership wrongfully. Section 8(a)(3) also permits an employer to require union
membership as a condition of employment. When union membership is a condition of employment, a United States employer must extend contract rights to all employees qualified to join
the union. See Taft-Hartley Act § 8(a)(3).
156. Id. § 158(a)(3).
157. TVG § 3(1).
158. Id. § 2(1).
159. Wolfgang Daubler, The Individual and the Collective: No Problemfor German Labor
Law?, 10 CoMp. LAB. L.J. 505, 511 (1988).
160. TVG § 3(1).
161. Interview with Dr. Franz-Jiirgen Sacker, Dean of the Juristische Fakultiit of Christian-Albrechts Universitiit at Kiel, in Hamburg, Germany (May 17, 1991).
162. Diiubler, supra note 159, at 511.
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after the union contract has been ratified and executed; and (2) the
contrasting inability of an employee to be excluded from the individual employer's works council agreement. Generally, a union contract
is between a large union representing a particular industry and a regional group of employers in that industry.163 In contrast, the works
council contract is between one employer and all of the employer's
workers. 164 Thus, the union and the works council cannot be regarded as representing conflicting interests. 16 5 Many union affiliates
are also works council members, even though the Labor-Management
Relations Act 166 gives no privilege or priority to labor unions regarding the election of council members.1 67
Another difference between the two types of contracts relates to
their form. Union collective bargaining agreements are required by
law to be written documents,' 68 while works council agreements are
not required to be written and are frequently reflected only in the
69
minutes of the meetings in which they were established.1
The German works council model, unlike the German unionmanagement contract, is quite similar to the United States' unionmanagement collective bargaining agreement. The following chart is
illustrative:
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Weiss, supra note 32, at 340.
DAubler, supra note 159, at 513-14.
ILO, supra note 7, at 141.
BetrVG.
ILO, supra note 7, at 137-38.
TVG § 125(2).
ILO, supra note 7, at 139.
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CONSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES TO WORKS COUNCILS AND
CODETERMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES

In the United States, property rights have historically been regarded as inviolate.1 70 The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution1 7 ' ensures that the federal government will not take
one's property without due process of law 72 or without just compensation.1 73 This latter directive provides for the payment of damages to
a property owner whose land has been converted to public use
170. See, e.g., Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 (1795).
171. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
172. "Due process" generally means fundamental fairness. See, e.g., International Shoe v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In InternationalShoe, the United States Supreme Court
held that the purpose of due process is to ensure the fair and orderly administration of the law.
See id. at 319. Typically, this guarantees a hearing in front of an impartial tribunal before
there is any adverse action affecting one's basic rights. See Ochoa v. Hernandez, 230 U.S. 139
(1912) (holding that the Due Process Clause prevents one's property from being taken and
given to another, without notice and the opportunity for a hearing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970) (holding termination of welfare benefits requires pre-termination evidentiary
hearing); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding social security disability benefits
can be terminated with hearing thereafter); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (holding
right to hearing before employment is terminated is required only where entitlement exists).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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through the power of eminent domain. 174 The United States Supreme
Court has construed the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause 175 to apply most of the same prohibitions to the states as the
Bill of Rights proscribes for the federal government. 176 Thus, any
limits that the Fifth Amendment places on Congress likewise apply to
77
the state legislatures via the Fourteenth Amendment.
Constitutional recognition of the value placed upon an individual's goods, belongings, and premises is also evidenced by the Fourth
Amendment's 178 protection against unlawful searches and seizures.
In See v. City of Seattle,179 the United States Supreme Court held that
this right extends to businesses, as well as to homeowners. 180 The
Court stated, "The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has
a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable
official entries upon his private commercial property."''
It is axiomatic that the owner of a business has a "property
right" in the management of his or her enterprise.8 2 This right is not
absolute-particularly when conflicting rights necessitate an accommodation. Such a limitation was applied in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 183 a case upholding the constitutionality of the Wagner
Act. 18 4 The United States Supreme Court held that the employer's
right to choose its employees was tempered by the employees' right of
freedom of association. 8 5 The Court also affirmed the employer's
right to select or discharge employees so long as the employer is not
motivated by an intent to interfere with the right of employees to
174. The final clause of the Fifth Amendment assures that private property shall not be
"taken for public use without just compensation." Id.
175. Id. amend. XIV.
176. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
177. The Second Amendment, the Third Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment's grand
jury indictment right have not been incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to
the states. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 784 (2d ed. 1991).

178. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
179. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
180. Id. at 546.
181. Id.at 543.
182. See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 590 (1979); see also Truax v. Corrigan, 257
U.S. 312 (1921); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1888); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.

36 (1872) (holding that a person's business is "property" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause).
183. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
184. See id.at 49.
185. Id. at 43-44 (discussing the employer's right to conduct its business and the employees' corresponding organizational rights under the statute).
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organize. 186
In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 187 the United States Supreme
Court upheld the right of businesses to prohibit the distribution of
printed materials on business premises. In that case, the Court considered whether an employer could legally prevent nonemployee
union organizers from distributing union literature in companyowned parking lots. 8 8 The Court held that the employer could deny
the organizers access to its property so long as "reasonable efforts by
the union through other available channels of communication will enable it to reach the employees with its message and if the employer's
notice or order does not discriminate against the union by allowing
other distribution."'' 8 9 Because the employer's plants were close to
small communities where many of the employees lived, various other
methods of imparting information were available to the union organizers.19° Accordingly, the employer could legally exclude nonem-

ployee union organizers from its parking lots and other company
property. 191
The United States Supreme Court also affirmed the employer's
right to manage company business in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine. 92 In Burdine, a female employee alleged that
her employer's refusal to promote her, and its decision to terminate
her, were based on gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.193 The Court refused to assign the employer the burden of proving that the male candidate had been better
qualified for the position than the plaintiff.194 Further, the Court
found that "the statute was not intended to 'diminish traditional management prerogatives,' "195 and thereby confirmed the employer's
right to manage.
Like the judiciary, the United States Congress has recognized the
separation of management from labor, exempting supervisory em186. Id. at 45-46.
187. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
188. See id. at 106-14.
189. Id. at 112.
190. Id. at 113.
191. Id. at 113-14.
192. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
193. See id. at 248. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color,
sex, religion, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988).
194. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258-59.
195. Id. at 259 (quoting United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207 (1979)).
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ployees from coverage under the Taft-Hartley Act. 96 Specifically,
section 152(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act precludes these employees
97
from associating for collective bargaining purposes.
The right of business owners to manage is also protected under
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act' 9 8 ("RMBCA"), which
serves as a guide for state corporation law.' 99 The RMBCA provides
that only a corporation's shareholders, who are its owners, may elect
the board of directors. 200 The board of directors is thereafter charged
20
with the duty of managing corporate affairs.
A United States employer's collective bargaining agreement with
a union differs in many respects from a German works council contract. First, an employer in the United States is required to negotiate
with a union only after a majority of employees in a bargaining unit
has chosen the union and the National Labor Relations Board has
officially certified the labor organization as the representative of all of
the employees in that bargaining unit. 20 2 In contrast, as few as five
employees of a German company, which may employ thousands, may
demand the establishment of a works council to approve rules that are
20 3
applicable to all company employees.
Second, the United States employer is required under the TaftHartley Act to bargain with the union concerning wages, hours, and
the terms and conditions of employment. 2°4 Further, the United
States Supreme Court has carefully avoided extending the concept of
"terms and conditions of employment" to traditionally accepted powers of management. 20 5 In contrast, the German works council can
object to an exhaustive list of twelve areas concerning workplace rules
proposed by management. 2°6 Thus, the powers of the German works
196. See Taft-Hartley Act § 152(3).
197. Id.
198. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (1985).
199. See id. at Introduction.
200. Id. §§ 7.28(a), 7.28 cmt.
201. Id. §§ 8.01(b), 8.01 cmt.
202. Taft-Hartley Act § 159(a).
203. BetrVG § 1.
204. Taft-Hartley Act § 158(d).
205. For cases holding various subjects not to be mandatory bargaining topics, see Allied
Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971) (changes in
medical insurance coverage for retired former employees); First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (employer's decision to close part of its business for purely economic reasons); Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984) (employer's decision to relocate
research and development operations in an effort to achieve better organizational efficiency).
206. MitbG § 87; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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council extend considerably farther than the three United States subject areas.
Third, United States employers generally enjoy the legal right to
terminate employment at will,2o7 provided that such termination does
not breach the employment contract 20 8 or violate an established public policy. 20 9 Statutory provisions guarantee employees the right not
to be discharged because of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, 210 or age. 211 In addition, the Occupational Safety and Health
Act 21 2 and the Taft-Hartley Act 2 13 prohibit retaliatory discharge in
response to an employee's exercise of statutory rights. If termination
does not violate any of these statutory principles, the United States
21 4
employer may terminate at will in the majority of jurisdictions.
Conversely, a German employment contract is statutorily presumed
to be terminable only for cause. 2 15 This German law arguably
abridges the concept of the employer's management rights.
Although the statutory rights of individual employees in the
207. See 48 AM. JUR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations § 9 (1985); see, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980) (physician demoted for refusing to conduct
research using substance she deemed dangerous to health of patients); Chin v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Div. 1979);
Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779 (Kan. 1976); Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc.,
362 S.E.2d 915 (Va. 1987) (employer had right to discharge employee in retaliation for participation in an employment-related grievance hearing).
208. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich.
1980) (discharge without cause is unlawful when employment manual indicates company policy is to terminate for cause only); Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J.
1985) (employment manual stating that an employee may be discharged only for cause is enforceable against the employer unless there is a clear and prominent disclaimer).
209. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985) (employee discharged after refusal to engage in activities during employee camping trip, such acts
being contrary to state statute prohibiting indecent exposure); Petermann v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959) (employee discharged after refusal to commit perjury
before a congressional committee investigating the employer's activities); Frampton v. Central
Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973) (employee discharged because he had filed workers'
compensation claim against employer); Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797
(Va. 1985) (employees terminated after claiming their proxies were obtained under duress pursuant to management's direction, in violation of state law assuring stockholders the right to
vote shares according to their own volition).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
211. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1967).
212. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678, 660(c)(1) (1970).
213. Taft-Hartley Act § 158(a)(3)-(4).
214. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Employment at Will: The Relationship Between Societal Expectations and the Law, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 455, 457 (1990).
215. KSchG § 1.
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United States have increased considerably, 21 6 only in the Taft-Hartley
Act are the collective rights of workers assured. These collective
rights are exercisable only by a majority vote, and clearly do not encroach upon true management powers. Despite expansive congressional recognition of workers' rights in recent years, 21 7 the United
States judiciary, like the federal and state legislatures, has tenaciously
adhered to the concept that management has rights that cannot be
divested. 218 The traditional shareholder election of the corporate
managing body is but one example of a management right that cannot
be divested. 21 9 Firmly entrenched in United States law is the understanding that even a union chosen by the majority of workers cannot
220
assume management privileges.
Would a legislatively mandated works council or codetermination right according to the German model usurp or impinge upon
management rights? If so, would courts consider such an encroachment as being of the "necessary" variety sanctioned by the United
States Supreme Court in Babcock & Wicox Co.? 221 Certainly, the
works council's right to object to an employer's planned discharge or
transfer of an employee is contrary to the employment-at-will rule
that prevails in the United States. 222 In addition, the works council's
participation in drafting workplace rules is a clear exercise of management powers. Further, the German Codetermination Act explicitly
empowers workers to participate in management activity by assuring
them an equal voice in electing and subsequently supervising the
223
board of managers.
This author contends that legislation implementing either works
councils or codetermination, or both, in the United States would unnecessarily violate the employer's property rights ensured by the Fifth
Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and arguably, the Fourth
Amendment. Although the German constitution also grants each
216. See supra notes 202-14 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (holding that
employees' contractual commitments not to join unions while employed ("yellow-dog" contracts) are enforceable). Congress later declared such contracts unenforceable in the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1926) and in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-

115 (1932).
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at 105; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248.
See supra text accompanying note 201.
See supra text accompanying note 205.
See supra text accompanying notes 187-91.
See supra text accompanying notes 207-14.
See MitbG.
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person the discretionary right to use and dispose of his property, 224
Germany's Federal Constitutional Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Codetermination Act against an invasion of property
225
rights claim.
Perhaps the difference between the FRG's and the United States'
understanding of "property rights" can be attributed to the FRG's
elevation of the right to associate to constitutional status. 226 Indeed,
the fact that the right to associate is included among the so-called
"Basic Rights" 2 27 presumably places it in a position of priority over
property rights. Quite likely, these two German statutes are simply
the lawmakers' method of balancing the two constitutionally assured
rights. No such rationale would be applicable in the United States,
since the collective rights of workers are not granted constitutional
protection, but are only protected by statute.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since the 1979 Federal Constitutional Court ruling, German
228 to
businesses have been surprisingly complacent and non-resistant
the parliamentary acts mandating employee input into what United
States courts have recognized as management prerogatives. United
States employers would assume a more combative role if Congress or
the state legislatures proposed similar mandatory employee participatory rights in management decision making.
Most likely, United States courts would find such an intrusion
upon traditionally accepted management prerogatives to be a "taking" of an employer's property. 229 Consequently, United States
courts would strike down such legislation as unconstitutional. Accordingly, anything less than an amendment to the United States
Constitution probably renders the adoption of either of these two
German principles unlikely. The line of demarcation separating management from labor powers in the United States is therefore quite
secure.
224.
225.
226.
227.

GG art. 44.
Judgment of March 1, 1979, 26 BVerfGE 1.
GG art. 9(3).
Id. arts. 1-19.

228. See MLSC, supra note 10, § 1.5(D)(6) (stating that most initial difficulties caused by
the Mitbestimmunggesetz have been overcome, and that codetermination now is "part of the
everyday life in German works").
229. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.,
475 U.S. 211, 215 (1986).

